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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOHN K. CROWLEY,
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
:

Case No. 2006-0712 CA

CHRIS BLACK,
Defendant/Appellee.

Plaintiff/Appellant John Crowley, by and through counsel, Brian M. Barnard,
submits the following REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT:

ISSUES PRESENTED & PRESERVED
Appellee Black's claim that attorney fees and pre-judgment interest were not
prayed for or presented below is not accurate.1 The trial court heard plaintiffs request for
attorney fees at the close of trial. Transcript, 106:19-23. The trial court heard and
considered plaintiffs motion for new trial which included plaintiffs' request for attorney
fees. Record 90-91. The trial court heard and considered plaintiffs request for
pre-judgment interest in reviewing the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law

1

The Complaint recites parties' written lease and a provision regarding attorney
fees. Record 1-5, Complaint,fflf4-6. The complaint recites that plaintiff has incurred
attorney fees. Record 1-5, Complaint f 14. Finally, the amount prayed for includes an
estimated amount for attorney fees. Record 1-5, Complaint, Prayer, p. 3.

and defendant's objection thereto. Record 110-111; 116; 128-129.
The trial court did not deny plaintiffs request for attorney fees because they were
not prayed for in the Complaint. See Record 90-92; 128-129. Similarly, the trial court
did not deny plaintiffs request for pre-judgment interest because it was not prayed for in
the Complaint. See Record 110-111; 128-129.
The issues on appeal were presented to and considered by the trial court and
properly preserved for this appeal.

SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENT
John Crowley sued Chris Black seeking damages for breach of a written rental
agreement. Crowley sought $5,538.00 in the Complaint. After a bench trial, the Hon.
Glenn Iwasaki Judge awarded Crowley $4,679.26 in damages.
The written rental agreement provided that Crowley as the prevailing party in a
lawsuit against his former tenant Black would be awarded attorney fees. The trial court
orally ruled there was no prevailing party. The trial court refused to award attorney fees
to Crowley. The trial court made insufficient findings to justify the denial of an award of
attorney fees.
Crowley was the successful party to the litigation; he was awarded the bulk of
damages sought in his complaint. Crowley was the prevailing party and the trial court
erred in not awarding attorney fees to Crowley.
The damages suffered by Crowley as a result of Black's misconduct were specific
2

and easily calculated with certainty as to when they were incurred. Crowley sought and
was entitled to prejudgment interest. The trial court refused to award prejudgment
interest to Crowley. The trial court made insufficient findings to justify the denial of
prejudgment interest.
Because damages were incurred in a certain amount and on certain dates, plaintiff
was entitled to and should have been awarded prejudgment interest. The trial court erred
in not awarding prejudgment interest.

REPLY ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IS
LEGAL ERROR BECAUSE LOSSES INCURRED ARE PRECISE SUMS
FIXED AT A DEFINITE TIME.
The law in Utah on this issue is clear:
Where the damage is complete and the amount of the loss is fixed as of a
particular time, and that loss can be measured by facts and figures, interest
should be allowed from that time . . . and not from the date of judgment.
On the other hand, where damages are incomplete or cannot be calculated
with mathematical accuracy, such as in the case of personal injury,
wrongful death, defamation of character, false imprisonment, etc., the
amount of the damages must be ascertained and assessed by the trier of the
fact at the trial, and in such cases prejudgment interest is not allowed.

Canyon Country Store v. Bracev. 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 1989) (quoting First Sec. Bank
of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedvards, Inc.. 653 P.2d 591, 600 (Utah 1982)); see also Bellon v.
Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089, 1097 (Utah 1991). The foregoing was recently confirmed by this

3

Court in Bennett v. Huish. _ P.3d _ , 2007 UT App. 19,fflf42 et seq. (Ut. Ct. App. 2007).
The amount of damages incurred by Crowley are in sums certain and because they
originated at a definite time, interest "can be calculated with mathematical accuracy."
Coalville City v. Lundgren. 930 P.2d 1206, 1212 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). The trial court
determined that upon moving out in November 2001, Black had caused damage, beyond
normal wear and tear, in the amount of $ 4,679.26. The court determined this amount
after trial where plaintiff Crowley presented the court with receipts, invoices and
testimony indicating that plaintiff had expended money repairing the residence damaged
by Black. Exhibits "P-4" - "P-8."
In Bennett v. Huish, _ P.3d _ , 2007 UT App. 19 (Ut. Ct. App. 2007), plaintiff
sought $27,955.98 in his complaint but was awarded only $18,643.98 after trial. Id, f 42.
That disparity did not result in plaintiff being denied pre-judgment interest. Id., ^f 45.
Crowley's loss is definite and fixed as to both amount ($4,679.26) and time
(November 2001). These two facts allow for the calculation of prejudgment interest
"with mathematical accuracy." See City of Coalville, supra. As such, the court below
committed legal error in denying plaintiffs request for prejudgment interest.
The trial court's denial of prejudgment interest is accorded no deference and will
be reviewed for correctness. Lefavi v. Bertoch, 2000 UT App. 5, % 23, 994 P.2d 817. On
appeal a denial of prejudgment interest is reviewed for correctness as a question of law.
Bennett v. Huish. _ P.3d _ , 2007 UT App. 19,fflf42 et seq. (Ut. Ct. App. 2007)("A trial

4

court's decision to grant or deny prejudgment interest presents a question of law which
we review for correctness." quoting Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, ^f 16, 82
P.3d 1064 (quotations and citation omitted)).
Here, the trial court heard and considered plaintiffs request for prejudgment
interest in reviewing the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and defendant's
objections thereto. Record at 116. A claim for prejudgment interest is a statutory claim.
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 (1953 as amended). In appropriate cases, such interest is
awarded as a matter of law. Id.
Plaintiff Crowley produced evidence and exhibits2 at trial which proved: (1) the
existence of damages in certain dollar amounts which were attributed to defendant's
breach of the lease agreements3; and (2) the breaches of the lease agreements occurred on
a fixed date.4 The trial resulted in damages fixed at an amount certain ($4,679.26) and a
fixed date (December 2001) of plaintiff s losses. Thus, the criteria for an award of

2

The Exhibits introduced at trial included receipts for work performed to repair
the damages caused by defendant. Exhibits "P-4" - "P-8." Those Exhibits provide the
exact date and the exact amount of money paid for each repair. Id.
3

See Conclusions of Law f 3 ("Defendant breached the lease agreement...");
See also Conclusions of Law U 10 ( "Plaintiff should be awarded . . . total money
damages of $4,679.26) (emphasis added).
4

See Findings of Factfflf7-12 ("Defendant terminated the lease and vacated the
premises in December 2001.* * * During the term of the lease, extensive damage
occurred to the home and premises, beyond normal wear and tear. That was a breach of
the lease ^{emphasis added).
5

prejudgment interest were met and plaintiff was entitled to such interest award as a
matter of law. See Coalville, supra at 1212.
A legal claim for prejudgment interest need not be specifically plead and proved at
trial by a plaintiff.5 Black cites no authority to support such a claim.
The trial court erred in denial of plaintiff s prejudgment interest claim.

IL

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENIED ATTORNEY FEES TO
PLAINTIFF DESPITE DEFENDANT'S CONTRACTUAL BREACH.
Whether a party is the prevailing party is a question for the trial court, and depends

in large measure on the context of each case. See R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 40 P.3d
1119, 1126-27 (Utah 2002). Therefore, "it is appropriate to leave this determination to
the sound discretion of the trial court." Id. Considerations for the trial court include, but
are not limited to,
(1) contractual language, (2) the number of claims, counterclaims, cross-claims,
etc., brought by the parties, (3) the importance of the claims relative to each other
and their significance in the context of the lawsuit as a whole, and (4) the dollar
amounts attached to and awarded in connection with the various claims.
Id. In the case at bar, the trial court's analysis failed to adequately address the R.T.
Nielson Co. factors and failed to make the necessary findings; its determination that
neither party prevailed falls outside the controlling law.

5

In similar fashion, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54 (d) and (e) provide for award
of court costs and/^ast-judgment interest and recite no condition that a complaint
specifically plead for such relief.
6

The court below summarily denied plaintiff Crowley's request for attorney's fees
based solely on its determination that the damages actually awarded to plaintiff
($4,679.26) fell short of the damages requested ($5,538.00), there was no prevailing
party. This oral observation by the trial court comprises the entirety of its prevailing party
analysis. The failure of the trial court to make any findings make appellate review
difficult, if not impossible. See Cabrera v. Cottrcll 694 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah
l9S5)(stating "an award [or denial] of attorneys fees must generally be made on the basis
of findings of fact supported by evidence and appropriate conclusions of law.").
The award of attorney fees and the determination of which litigant is the prevailing
party for purposes of awarding such fees are decisions left to the discretion of the trial
court. See R.T. Nielson Co. v. CooL 40 P.3d 1119, 1126-27 (Utah 2002). However, in
exercising the discretionary authority to award or deny attorney fees, the court's decision
must be supported by adequate findings of fact and appropriate conclusions of law. See
Utahns for Better Dental Health-Davis Inc. v. Davis County Comm'n. 121 P.3d 39, 41
(Utah Ct. App. 2005). In denying plaintiffs request for attorney fees, the Court below
failed to support its decision with the requisite findings and failed to adhere to the
analytical frameworks approved by the appellate courts for determining which party
prevailed.
The mere fact that plaintiff was not awarded every dollar prayed for is not
sufficient for the trial court to determine that plaintiff was not the prevailing party.

7

Utahns for Better Dental supra. The trial court's oral discussion is devoid of any legal
authority for the proposition that attorney fees must be denied when a litigant's recovery
is less than originally prayed for. See Tr. Transcr. 106: 1-25. The controlling authority
requires more analysis in a prevailing party determination. See, e.g., R.T. Nielson Co. v.
Cook, 40 P.3d 1119, 1126-27 (Utah 2002); see also Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v.
Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
The trial court's sparse analysis orally expressed at close of trial is inadequate
under either R.T. Nielson or Mountain States Broadcasting.6 Appellee fails to cite legal
authority to show that the trial court had any basis for or properly supported its exercise of
discretion.7
6

The Court's prevailing party/attorney fees analysis is limited to:

Based upon this analysis, the Court finds that while you may have prevailed
on certain aspects of it, you certainly did not prevail to the total amount that
you're asking for. The court finds that under these particular circumstances, there is no prevailing party. As such, no attorney's fees will be
granted.
Tr. Transcr. 106: 19-23.
7

The few cases cited by defendant/appellee deal not with the sufficiency of a
court's prevailing party/ attorney fees analysis but, rather, with the calculation of an
amount for attorney fees. Appellee's Brief at 10. These cases are not helpful nor
pertinent to the case at bar in which there was no calculation as to an amount of
attorney's fees. The trial court never progressed to a point where fee amounts were
considered. There was a total denial of attorney fees with little or no explanation from
the court as to which facts or law supported such a conclusion. This lack of articulated,
reasoned analysis runs afoul of principles announced in Utahns for Better Dental R.T.
Nielson, and Mountain States, supra. Defendant/appellee's cited cases do not vitiate this
abuse of discretion.
8

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF
ATTORNEY FEES
The trial court provided little explanation in its oral ruling as to the factual or legal
reason for the denial of an award of attorney fees. The trial court entered inadequate
findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding attorney fees.
Plaintiff was the prevailing party because a judgment for past due rent, lost rent
and for damages to the rental property was awarded to plaintiff at trial.
Based upon the written lease, as the prevailing party, plaintiff is entitled to and
should have been awarded attorney fees and out of pocket expenses incurred in the
successful pursuit of this action.

PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
In this landlord and tenant dispute, Plaintiff was awarded special damages for
unpaid rent, for lost rent, and for damage caused to plaintiffs rental property during
defendant's occupancy. All those damages are in amounts certain established by
evidence or receipts showing payment made by plaintiff in 2001 and early 2002.
With clear and specific factual information, plaintiffs special damages as set by
the Court below were measured by "facts and figures" or "calculated with mathematical
accuracy." Under these circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled, as a matter of law, to
prejudgment interest.

9

This Court should rule that plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees and prejudgment
interest. This matter should be remanded to the trial Court with a determination that
plaintiff Crowley is the prevailing party and is entitled to an award of attorney fees and is
entitled to an award of pre-judgment interest. Plaintiff should be granted his costs and
attorney fees incurred on appeal.
DATED this 15th day of MARCH 2007.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
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